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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the Seton 
Hall Circuit Review members, of circuit splits identified by a federal 
court of appeals opinion between September 1, 2005 and January 31, 
2006. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then by 
subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Westfall Act – Judicial Fact Finding: Osborn v. Haley, 422 F.3d 
359 (6th Cir. 2005) 
 
In Osborn, the court looked at two issues, including “whether 
district courts evaluating a scope certification [in a Westfall Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679, context] can resolve material disputes about the facts . . . 
[and] whether a federal court possesses the authority to remand if it 
ultimately finds substitution . . . inappropriate.” Id. at 361-62.  The 1st 
Circuit, in Wood v. United States, 995 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1993), “took 
the position that the Westfall Act does not permit judicial factfinding 
where the Attorney General’s certification essentially denies the 
plaintiff’s central allegation of wrongdoings.” Id. The dissent in Wood, 
however, felt that “district courts must resolve all factual disputes 
relevant to whether the defendant acted within the scope of 
employment.” Id. Notably, since Wood, “[t]he majority of courts 
addressing the issue . . . have adopted the dissenters’ approach.” Id. at 
363. Here, the 6th Circuit adopted the dissenters’ position in Wood. Id. 
With regard to the Attorney General’s certification, the court also 
“agree[s] with the majority view that the clear language of the Act 
forecloses remand. . . .[and that] the district court lacked authority to 
remand the action.” Id. at 365. 
 
Fair Labor Standards Act – Salary-Basis Test: Whisman v. Ford 
Motor Co., 157 F. App’x 792 (6th Cir. 2005) 
 
The Supreme Court decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997) resolved a circuit split “over the meaning of the phrase ‘subject 
to’ as used in the salary-basis test,” which is used to determine if an 
individual is a salaried or hourly employee. Id. at 796. In that decision, 
the Court looked to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation stating that 
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“employees are subject to a reduction in pay when they ‘are covered by a 
policy that permits disciplinary or other deductions in pay’ as a practical 
matter.” Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).  “That standard is met . . . if 
there is either an actual practice of making such deductions or an 
employment policy that creates a ‘significant likelihood’ of such 
deductions.” Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).  The 6th Circuit 
suggests that there may be a split among the circuits in how to interpret 
the phrase “significant likelihood.” Id. at 797. Some circuits require an 
employer’s policy to state that a salaried employee’s pay will be docked 
if the employee acts in certain ways in order to establish a violation of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); however, a 6th Circuit decision in 
Tackacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., 246 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2001), suggests that 
a policy that states that “pay adjustments are a possibility” may be 
sufficient to establish a violation. Id. The 6th Circuit avoids a clearer 
interpretation by concluding that the facts of the case show that the 
defendant never implemented or enforced any policy that would violate 
the FLSA and therefore no further analysis is needed. Id. at 798. 
 
Equal Pay Act – Business Reason Requirement: Wernsing v. 
Dept. of Human Services, State of Illinois, 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 
2005) 
 
In concurrence with the 8th Circuit, the 7th Circuit held that the 
Equal Pay Act does not require an to employer show an acceptable 
“business reason” for its employment practice. Id. at 469. The 7th Circuit 
noted that an employer only need to avoid using race and sex as a criteria 
for setting its pay scale and in this case, setting initial pay for lateral 
transferees based on their pay in their previous position was not 
discriminatory because the initial pay practice was based on a factor 
other than sex. Id. at 466. The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd, 6th, 9th 
and 11th Circuits which have held that “wages in a former job are a 
‘factor other than sex’ only if the employer has an ‘acceptable business 
reason’ for setting the employee’s starting pay in this fashion.” Id. at 
468. The 7th Circuit determined that the text of the Equal Pay Act statute 
does not state an “acceptable-business-reason requirement” and that 
employers are justified in looking to the competitive markets for setting 
pay scales. Id. at 469-70. The 7th Circuit found alliance with the 8th 
Circuit in resisting the requirement of a business reason for setting initial 
pay rates. Id. at 470. 
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Title VII – Federal Jurisdiction: Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & 
Mktg., L.L.C., 425 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
The 2nd Circuit, in both this case and its previous jurisprudence, 
has held that the fifteen-employee requirement under Title VII is a 
question which goes to the merits of the claim. Id. at 197 n.4. However, 
the court noted that the 5th Circuit has held that if the fifteen-employee 
requirement is not met, then the court loses jurisdiction completely. Id. 
Certiorari has been granted on the issue. 
 
ERISA – Waiver of Benefits by Beneficiary: McGowan v. NJR 
Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) 
 
Pursuant to a marital settlement agreement arising out of the 
dissolution of their marriage, petitioner McGowan and his former wife 
Rosemary agreed that Rosemary waived all rights as a beneficiary of 
McGowan’s ERISA plan. Id. at 243. McGowan then sought to name his 
current wife as the beneficiary under the plan, but the plan administrator, 
NJNG, “refused to recognize McGowan’s nomination of . . . the new . . . 
beneficiary and maintained that Rosemary was still the beneficiary under 
the plan.” Id. In determining whether a change of beneficiary had 
occurred in this case, the 3rd Circuit first identified a split among the 
circuits regarding “the issue of whether administrators of an ERISA plan 
are required to recognize a beneficiary’s waiver of his or her benefits.” 
Id. at 244. The court stated that the majority of circuits to have addressed 
this issue (the 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 10th) have found that since “ERISA 
does not explicitly address ‘waiver’ by a beneficiary, [courts] may turn to 
federal common law to determine whether, and under what 
circumstances, an individual may validly waive her benefits in an ERISA 
plan.” Id. at 245. Under this federal common law approach “an 
individual’s waiver is valid if, ‘upon reading the language in the divorce 
decree, a reasonable person would have understood that she was waiving 
her beneficiary interest.’” Id. (quoting Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 271-
72 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
Disagreeing with the majority approach, the 3rd Circuit stated that 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) “dictates that it is the documents on file with 
the Plan, and not outside private agreements between beneficiaries and 
participants, that determine the rights of the parties.” Id. at 245-46. To 
the 3rd Circuit this meant that “any requirement imposed on Plan 
administrators to look beyond these documents would go against the 
specific command of § 1104(a)(1)(D).” Id. at 246. For this reason the 3rd 
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Circuit held as a bright-line rule that outside waivers are not binding on 
plan administrators. Id. 
 
Railway Labor Act – Preemption of Minor Disputes: Sullivan v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
In this defamation suit, the 2nd Circuit aligned itself with the 3rd, 
6th, and 11th Circuits and held that no complete preemption exists under 
the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), even if the state-law claims did qualify 
as minor claims. Id. at 277-78. The court noted that, under the RLA, 
ordinary preemption is a viable defense and minor disputes or state-law 
claims disguised as minor disputes must be heard first by arbitral panels. 
Id. at 273. However, in determining if complete preemption exists under 
the RLA, the court held that the federal statute must be determined to 
provide “the exclusive cause of action” for the asserted claim. Id. at 275-
76 (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 (2003)). If 
it does, the asserted claim is conclusively based on federal law so as to 
effectuate original federal jurisdiction and, therefore, it is authorized that 
the claim be removed to federal court. Id. The court held that minor 
disputes under the RLA cannot be filed in federal courts in the first 
instance but rather must be filed before an adjustment board and, 
therefore, removal of these claims to federal court based on complete 
preemption grounds is internally inconsistent. Id. at 276. Finally, the 
court noted that the RLA provides for only limited federal-court review 
of decisions of the adjustment board and clarified that Congress had the 
power to create a cause of action in federal court had it so wished. Id. at 
277. 
 
CERCLA – Successor Liability: United States v. Gen. Battery 
Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005) 
 
Price Battery Corp., a now defunct company, manufactured lead 
acid batteries and disposed of its waste materials, including spent battery 
casings from the 1930s through 1966. Id. at 296. Consequently, millions 
of dollars in environmental response costs were incurred by the United 
States upon discovery of its disposal sites. Id. “Seeking to identify a 
responsible party under CERCLA,” the United States filed suit against 
Exide Corp. alleging that “it was responsible for [the defunct 
corporation’s] CERCLA liability as a successor in interest.” Id. at 309. 
The court found Exide Corp. to be the successor in interest to General 
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Battery Corp., Inc., the initial successor corporation as a result of a 
common law de facto merger with Price Battery. The threshold issue, 
however, and the one over which circuits are split, was “whether to apply 
a uniform federal rule of successor liability [in order to determine 
liability under CERCLA], or whether to apply the law of a particular 
state.” Id. at 298. In finding that “the issue of successor liability in this 
context is controlled by federal common law,” the 3rd Circuit 
“perpetuated” a circuit split, namely with the 1st and 9th Circuits which 
hold, in contrast, “that only in the most limited circumstances should 
[courts] look beyond applicable state law.” Id. at 309-10. 
 
BANKRUPTCY 
 
Discharge of Student Loans – Declaration or Adversary 
Proceeding: Whelton v. Educational Credit Mgmt. Corp., 432 F.3d 
150 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
In this creditor’s action to have a consolidated student loan declared 
nondischargeable, the court noted that the circuits have split regarding 
whether a discharge of student loans can be obtained by declaration, 
rather than in an adversary proceeding. Id. at 153. The 9th and 10th 
Circuits have allowed the discharge if the student loan creditor was 
provided with notice of discharge declaration’s placement in the 
bankruptcy plan, and failed to object. Id. (citing Great Lakes Higher 
Educ. v. Pardee, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); Andersen v. UNIPAC-
NEBHELP, 179 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1999)). More recent decisions from 
the 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits, however, have held that the institution of an 
adversary proceeding is necessary to have a student loan declared 
discharged. Id. at 154 (citing Banks v. Sallie Mae Serv. Corp., 299 F.3d 
296 (4th Cir. 2002); Ruehle v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 412 F.3d 679 
(6th Cir. 2005); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005)). The 2nd 
Circuit joined with these latter circuits in holding that adversary 
proceedings are required to have student loans discharged by declaration. 
Id. at 155. 
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Chapter 7 and 13 Filings – Concurrent Proceedings: In re 
Sidebottom, 430 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2005) 
 
The 7th Circuit considered “whether [a debtor] was entitled to 
maintain a Chapter 13 proceeding while a Chapter 7 proceeding 
involving the same debts was pending.” Id. at 896. The court joined the 
majority of bankruptcy courts holding that a debtor may not maintain a 
Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 proceeding at the same time. Id. at 897. 
However, the court posited that the 10th Circuit “may” allow “two or 
more concurrent actions with respect to the same debts.” Id. at 898. 
 
Reclassification of Deficiencies – Sale of Collateral to Creditor: 
In re Adkins, 425 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 2005) 
 
In this case, the 6th Circuit noted a circuit split regarding “whether 
[11 U.S.C. § 1329] allow[s] a debtor to modify a confirmed plan by 
surrendering collateral to a secured creditor . . . and then reclassifying 
any deficiency resulting from the sale . . . as an allowed unsecured claim 
to be paid back at the generally reduced rate for unsecured creditors set 
forth in the plan.” Id. at 299. However, the 6th Circuit previously held 
that § 1329 did not allow such reclassification. Id. Thus, the court, 
remaining true to precedent, held that a debtor “generally cannot move to 
reclassify the deficiency resulting from the sale of the underlying 
repossessed collateral as an unsecured claim.” Id. at 305. 
 
Standing – Rule 9019 Settlement: In re Smart World Techs., 
L.L.C., 423 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
In this case, the 2nd Circuit vacated and remanded the district 
court’s decision to affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court to grant 
creditor-appellees standing to pursue settlement of an adversary 
proceeding under FED. R. BANK. P. 9019, despite objections of the 
debtor-in-possession. Id. at 168. While a creditor’s standing under these 
circumstances raised an issue of first impression, the district court held 
that the bankruptcy court was within its powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 
to allow the creditors to settle. Id. at 173. Section 105(a) grants equitable 
powers to the bankruptcy court to implement the Bankruptcy Code 
provisions. Id. at 183. The 2nd Circuit noted a disagreement that existed 
among the circuit courts regarding how broadly to construe § 105(a) 
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power to fill the gaps left in the Code’s language. Id. The court declared 
that under its own precedent the grant of equitable power is limited such 
that bankruptcy courts are barred from creating substantive rights that are 
not otherwise available under applicable law. Id. (citing In re Dairy Mart 
Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
Accordingly, the court held that the power granted under § 105 did not 
provide the bankruptcy court with an independent basis to grant 
appellees standing. Id. at 184. 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Class Action – Standard of Review: In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) 
 
The 1st Circuit reviewed a lower court’s certification of a class 
action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Id. at 2. Defendants, officers 
and directors of a financially troubled company argued that the district 
court erred in allowing a large group of stock investors to be certified. Id. 
The court noted that the standard of review for granting class 
certification was “abuse of discretion,” but Rule 23 provided that some 
issues of class certification could be reviewed de novo. Id. at 4. 
Specifically, the court had to determine whether it would look beyond 
the “four corners” of the pleading to determine whether certification was 
proper. Id. at 5. The 2nd Circuit had found that a district court could “not 
weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in ‘statistical dueling’ of 
experts” when determining certification. Id. (citing Caridad v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
Conversely, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits developed a 
standard where “a decision on class certification cannot be made in a 
vacuum,” and “some inspection of the circumstances of the case is 
essential” to determine whether certification is appropriate. Id. (citing 
Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). In overturning 
the class certification, the 1st Circuit demonstrated its preference for the 
majority position, determining that a review beyond the pleadings was 
the right course for Rule 23(b)(3) class certifications. Id. at 6. 
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Section 1983 – Attorney’s Fees: Wendt v. Leonard, 431 F.3d 410 
(4th Cir. 2005) 
 
A state taxpayer brought a § 1983 action against state officials, 
alleging violations of his civil rights in the seizure of his property to 
fulfill a tax liability. Id. at 412. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, awarded attorney’s fees to 
defendants under § 1988, and denied a FED. R. CIV. P. 60 motion to 
vacate. Id. at 410. The 4th Circuit undertook an examination of the 
definition of “void” under Rule 60(b)(4) to determine if attorney’s fees 
could be awarded in a matter that was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 413. The 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 7th Circuits 
developed a standard which found a court order void for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction “only when there is a ‘total want of jurisdiction’ and 
no arguable basis on which it could have rested a finding that it had 
jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 
27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972)). The 6th Circuit had held that that 
a Rule 60(b)(4) motion would succeed “only if the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction was so glaring as to constitute a total want of jurisdiction, or 
no arguable basis for jurisdiction existed.” Id. (citing In re G.A.D. Inc., 
340 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2003)). Concluding that there was an 
arguable basis for jurisdiction, the 4th Circuit upheld the awarding of 
attorney’s fees against plaintiff. Id. at 414. 
 
Removal – Forum Defendant Rule: Horton v. Conklin, 431 F.3d 
602 (8th Cir. 2005) 
 
The 8th Circuit considered whether a violation of the forum 
defendant rule is a procedural defect. Id. at 605. The forum defendant 
rule provides that “a non-federal question case ‘shall be removable only 
if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants 
is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought.” Id. at 604 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000)). The court reaffirmed that “the 
violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect and ‘not a 
mere procedural irregularity capable of being waived.” Id. at 605 
(quoting Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 1992)).  
However, the court did acknowledge that the 7th Circuit has held the 
“violation of the forum defendant rule is a procedural, nonjurisdictional 
defect.”  Id. 
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Antitrust Law – Service and Venue Provisions: Daniel v. Am. 
Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
In an amended complaint, plaintiffs, licensed physicians, brought 
suit against several medical entities, complaining that the defendants 
violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 414. Plaintiff 
physicians appealed the district court’s dismissal of their amended 
complaint for lack of antitrust standing. Id. Defendants further insisted 
that the district court lacked “personal jurisdiction and venue in the 
Western District of New York.” Id. “The district court concluded that 
New York law did not provide for personal jurisdiction over [some of the 
defendants] but that Section 12 of the Clayton Act did.” Id. at 420. 
Section 12 states that “[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the 
antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the 
judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district 
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such 
cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or 
wherever it may be found.” Id. at 422 (quoting 15 U.S.C.S. § 12 (2005)). 
“The part after the semicolon provides for worldwide service of process 
and, therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction ‘in such cases.’” Id. 
Thus, the question for this court was “whether service of process (and 
personal jurisdiction) is available under Section 12 only in cases 
satisfying the section’s specific venue provision or regardless how venue 
is established.” Id. 
The split between circuits is “over the proper interpretation of the 
venue and process provisions of Section 12.” Id. The 3rd and 9th Circuits 
have held that the service of process and venue provisions of Section 12 
were independent of each other. Id. at 422-23 (citing In re Automotive 
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1179-
80 (9th Cir. 2004)). Conversely, the D.C. Circuit held that “‘the language 
of the statute is plain, and its meaning seems clear: . . . Invocation of the 
nationwide service clause rests on satisfying the venue provision.’” Id. at 
423 (quoting GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 
1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The 2nd Circuit joined the D.C. Circuit 
and held “that the plain language of Section 12 indicates that its service 
of process provision applies (and, therefore, establishes personal 
jurisdiction) only in cases in which its venue provision is satisfied.” Id. 
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Administrative Jurisdiction – Standard of Review: S. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735 (10th 
Cir. 2005) 
 
In a land use dispute case, the 10th Circuit looked at “the standard 
of review of decisions whether to recognize the primary jurisdiction of 
an administrative agency.” Id. at 750. The 10th Circuit, siding with the 
4th and D.C. Circuits, used the abuse of discretion standard. Id. 
However, the 8th, 1st, 2nd, and 9th Circuits use a de novo standard of 
review. Id. The court explained that “[p]rimary jurisdiction is a 
prudential doctrine designed to allocate authority between courts and 
administrative agencies.” Id. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction “allows 
the court to stay the judicial proceedings and direct the parties to seek a 
decision before the appropriate administrative agency.” Id. at 750-751. 
The doctrine effectuates “regulatory uniformity and agency expertise . . . 
[which] drive the primary jurisdiction analysis.” Id. at 751. The 10th 
Circuit decided not to overturn prior circuit precedent, holding that the 
Bureau of Land Management did not hold jurisdiction over rights of way. 
Id. at 758. 
 
Diversity Jurisdiction – Agent’s Citizenship: Pramco, LLC v. San 
Juan Bay Marina, Inc., 435 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2006) 
 
There is a potential split among the circuits as to whether an agent’s 
citizenship may be used to determine complete diversity, or if the 
underlying party’s own citizenship must be used. Id. at 55. The 2nd and 
8th Circuits both held that the “citizenship of an agent who merely sues 
on behalf of the real parties must be ignored.” Id. Conversely, the 3rd 
Circuit found that the named plaintiff’s citizenship, even an agent, may 
be relevant to determining diversity jurisdiction. Id. However, the 3rd 
Circuit modified this holding to bar diversity when the agent was 
appointed “solely to create diversity jurisdiction.” Id. The 1st Circuit 
declined to join either side and remanded the issue to the district court. 
Id. at 56. 
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Securities Litigation – Pleading Requirements: Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 
This case presented the 7th Circuit with the issue of whether the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) “requires the 
plaintiff to support with particularity . . . the falsity of the statement of 
fact or the omission, and its materiality.” Id. at 595. Although it is clear 
that more than general allegations of fraud must be present, “[i]t is not 
enough simply to allege in general that the defendant’s statement was 
false and material.” Id. Siding with the 2nd Circuit, the 7th Circuit found 
that “[a]lthough § 78u-4(b)(1) requires a complaint to state ‘all facts on 
which that belief is formed,’ this does not mean that a complaint 
automatically survives if it lists ‘all’ of the facts supporting the plaintiff’s 
belief. Nor does it mean that if the plaintiff alleges sufficient facts but 
leaves out a redundant detail, the court must dismiss the complaint.” Id. 
Furthermore, a literal reading would be “[c]ontrary to the clearly 
expressed purpose of the PSLRA, [as] it would allow complaints to 
survive dismissal where ‘all’ the facts supporting the plaintiff’s 
information and belief were pled, but those facts were patently 
insufficient to support that belief.” Id. Thus, adopting the 2nd Circuit’s 
framework for determining whether a pleading is sufficiently particular, 
the court held that the relevant question is “whether the facts alleged are 
sufficient to support a reasonable belief as to the misleading nature of the 
statement or omission.” Id. 
 
Premature Appeal – Ripen After Final Judgment: Adapt of 
Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 
2006) 
 
This case involved “the statutory obligation of the . . . [PHA] to 
furnish housing for disabled tenants.” Id. at 354. Regarding this 
obligation, certain advocacy groups “sought medical information as to 
each tenant [whose housing was furnished by the PHA] to confirm that 
the PHA had complied with the terms of [their obligation.]” Id. at 354-
55. The district court entered three separate discovery orders for these 
records, and appeals were filed after all three, prior to the entry of the 
district court’s final order “denying all motions to enforce the 
Agreement.” Id. at 355. The question of whether a premature notice of 
appeal filed before the announcement of an order could ripen upon entry 
of the final order is the subject of a circuit split between the 3rd and 7th 
Circuits. Id. at 361-61. For the 3rd Circuit, “a premature notice of appeal, 
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filed after disposition of some of the claims before a district court, but 
before entry of final judgment, will ripen upon the court’s disposal of the 
remaining claims.” Id. at 362 (citing Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 
698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3rd Cir. 1983)). The position of the 7th Circuit is 
that this question is settled by FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2), which states that 
“‘a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order 
but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after 
such entry and on the day thereof.’” United States v. Hansen, 795 F.2d 
35, 37 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting, FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2)). In this case, the 
3rd Circuit maintained its position with respect to the rule laid down in 
Cape May Greene, but held nonetheless that the facts of the present case 
did not fit within the Cape May Greene framework because the 3rd 
Circuit’s position that a premature notice of appeal can ripen on entry of 
a final order even when such an appeal is made before the announcement 
of decision does not apply to “discovery or similar interlocutory orders.” 
Adapt of Philadelphia, 433 F.3d at 364-65. 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Appellate Jurisdiction – Immigration Judge Removal Decision: 
Lopez v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005) 
 
In this case, the 7th Circuit addressed the issue of whether it has 
jurisdiction to review an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) removal decision 
that contains reviewable and nonreviewable grounds, when the Board of 
Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision without adopting his 
reasoning. Id. at 495. The 7th Circuit noted that the 1st, 5th, and 9th 
Circuits have held that the proper disposition is such cases “is to remand 
to the [Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)] so that it may clarify the 
basis of its holding.” Id. In contrast, the 7th Circuit explained that the 
10th Circuit looks to the IJ’s decision, not the BIA’s unexplained 
reasons, when deciding whether it has appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 496. 
The 7th Circuit adopted the view of the 1st, 5th, and 9th Circuits. Id. The 
court explained that this approach is consistent with due process, which 
requires that it determine whether the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision 
because of its procedural or substantive findings. Id. 
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Section 212(c) Waiver – Retroactivity: Kelava v. Gonzales, 434 
F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) 
 
In 1978, Kelava, an alien from Croatia, “entered the West German 
Consulate in Chicago, armed with handguns, ropes and a phony bomb” 
and “seized several employees.” Id. at 1122. At retrial, he plead guilty 
and was sentenced for unarmed imprisonment of a foreign national. Id. at 
1122. In removal proceedings nearly 20 years later, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) found Kelava was removable for the 
terrorist activity and “precluded from seeking a [§ 212(c)] waiver of 
inadmissibility under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).” Id. The alien argued that it was 
“impermissibly retroactive to deny him eligibility” for a § 212(c) waiver, 
which was previously available before it was repealed by “the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”) § 304(b), and was replaced with a new form of discretionary 
relief called cancellation of removal, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.” Id. 
n.3 (citation omitted). The Court disagreed with petitioner, finding that 
“removability does not hinge on a ‘conviction’” and thus it was not 
impermissibly retroactive to deny him eligibility for a § 212(c) waiver 
for engaging in a terrorist activity. Id. at 1124. Rather, “Kelava is 
ineligible for relief under this new provision because he is deportable for 
having engaged in terrorist activity [pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(c)(4)].” Id. at 1122 n.3. The Court, recognizing that there was a 
circuit split on this issue, opined that “it cannot reasonably be argued that 
aliens committed crimes in reliance on such a possibility [of § 212(c) 
relief].” Id. at 1125. This approach, as also followed by the 7th and 2nd 
Circuits, however, differs from the 3rd and 4th Circuits which argue 
“that some sort of reliance by an alien on existing immigration laws is 
not a requisite in the retroactivity analysis.” Id. n.7. 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
Copyright Infringement – Attorney’s Fees: Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2005) 
 
There is a split among the circuits as to whether non-taxable costs 
may be awarded in copyright infringement cases under § 505 of the 1976 
Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 505), because the Supreme Court ruled in 
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Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) that a 
court may not exceed the award limits created in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 
1821 without “plain evidence of congressional intent to supersede those 
sections.” Id. at 884 (quoting Crawford Fitting Co., 482. U.S. at 445). 
The 8th Circuit held that § 505 did not “clearly evidence congressional 
intent” to go beyond § 1920 and § 1821, while the 7th Circuit disagreed 
and held that non-taxable costs may be awarded under § 505. Id. at 855. 
The 9th Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit to determine that “district 
courts may award otherwise non-taxable costs, including those that lie 
outside the scope of § 1920, under § 505. Id. 
 
Trade Dress Infringement – Appeals and R. 52(b): Natural 
Organics, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 426 F.3d 576 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
“At issue are the trade dresses of two competing soy protein drink 
mixes: Natural Organics’ ‘SPIRU-TEIN’; and ‘Soytein,’ which is made 
by Nutraceutical Corp. and Solaray, Inc. (“Nutraceutical”). Natural 
Organics alleges in essence that the Soytein label is virtually identical to 
the SPIRU-TEIN label, and that confusion is likely between the two 
products in the marketplace.” Id. at 577. The district court ruled in favor 
of defendant Nutraceutical, finding that “the products’ ‘trade dresses are 
sufficiently distinguishable considering their individual elements and the 
total impressions they give to customers.’” Id. at 578. Natural Organics 
claims that the district court erred by failing to consider all eight 
Polaroid factors. Id. at 578-79. Rather than filing for amendment under 
Rule 52(b), regarding judgment on partial findings, appellant Natural 
Organics filed for notice of appeal. Id. at 578.  
“There is a split in the circuits on the question of whether to 
preclude appeals by parties who have not made use of Rule 52(b).” Id. at 
579. The 8th and 9th Circuits “hold that a party’s failure to make use of 
Rule 52(b) forecloses arguments on appeal that the district court failed to 
make certain factual findings, or that its findings lack sufficient 
specificity.” Id. Conversely, the 1st Circuit “has held that failure to file a 
Rule 52(b) motion in the district court does not preclude appeal.” Id. 
(citing Supermercados Econo, Inc. v. Integrand Assurance Co., 375 F.3d 
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004)). The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit, 
reasoning that to “endorse a rule requiring that a party wishing to appeal 
the absence of a factual finding must first make a Rule 52(b) motion . . . 
would burden district courts with unnecessary Rule 52(b) motions.” Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Tenth Amendment – Standing to Sue: Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 
F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2005) 
 
Plaintiff, a lobsterman, brought suit against the federal government 
and claimed a Tenth Amendment infringement resulting from 
environmental regulations. Id. at 33. The 1st Circuit discussed the 
historical significance of Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth. 
(“TVA”), 306 U.S. 118 (1939), which held that private citizens lacked 
standing to bring Tenth Amendment claims. Although TVA has not been 
expressly overruled by subsequent Supreme Court precedent, the 7th and 
11th Circuits have allowed private causes of action in certain 
circumstances. Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 35. In declining to follow the 11th 
and 7th Circuits, and joining the 10th and D.C. Circuits, the court stated 
that it was “reluctant to second-guess” the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, and held that plaintiff did not have standing to pursue a 
Tenth Amendment claim. Id. at 36. 
 
 
CRIMINAL 
SENTENCING 
 
Sentencing Guidelines – Meaning of “any”: United States v. 
Williams, 431 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2005) 
 
In Williams, the 11th Circuit joined the 8th and 10th circuits in 
concluding that the term “any” is general and non-specific and therefore 
when “any” is used in the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) it refers to any firearm 
the defendant possessed at the time of arrest regardless of whether or not 
the defendant was charged with possessing that firearm. Id. at 769-70. 
The court noted that when the Sentencing Guideline applies to a 
particular firearm, the Guidelines use “the,” which is particular and 
specific. Id. at 770. Therefore, in the context of sentencing, “any” truly 
means “any” and does not have to have direct relation to the crime being 
charged in order to be considered. Id. In dicta, the 5th Circuit has 
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disagreed with this reasoning and concluded that “any firearm” must at 
least relate to the charge in the indictment. Id. 
 
Cross Reference Conduct – Relevancy to Charged Offense: 
United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2005) 
 
Here, the 11th Circuit joined the 6th, 7th, and 10th circuits in 
concluding that a cross referenced offense in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c) must 
be within the relevant conduct of the charged offense. Id. at 772. 
Therefore, § 1B1.3’s relevant conduct definition must be applied to the 
conduct contained in § 2K2.1(c). Id. at 771. The 11th Circuit adopted the 
reasoning of the 7th Circuit which relies on the language of § 1B1.3 that 
expressly states, “cross references under Chapter Two have to fit under 
the relevant conduct test.” Id. In contrast, the 5th Circuit has held that “§ 
1B1.3’s strictures [sic] on relevant conduct do not apply to § 2K2.1(c)’s 
cross referenced conduct.” Id. at 772. 
 
Post-Booker – Harmless Error: United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 
744 (11th Cir. 2005) 
 
In this case, the 11th Circuit, recognizing that it is just as hard for 
the government to meet the harmless error standard as it is for a 
defendant to meet the standard for plain error review, and that “‘the fact 
that the district court sentenced the defendant to the bottom of the 
applicable guidelines range’ does not establish plain error,” it decided 
that “[t]o announce a rule that a mid-range sentence establishes harmless 
error would run counter to these holdings.” Id. at 750. The court noted 
that, “[t]he government must do more than rely upon a mid-range 
sentence to satisfy its burden under the harmless error standard.” Id. This 
ruling is in dispute with the determination of the 8th and 10th Circuits. 
Id.  
 
Post-Booker – Harmless Error: United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d 
255 (5th Cir. 2006) 
 
Defendant appealed his sentence for bank fraud, claiming that the 
Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Booker necessitated a 
resentencing. Id. at 256. The government contended that vacating of the 
sentence was improper, because the district court’s error was harmless.  
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Id. at 257. Specifically, the government claimed that under FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 52(a), there was no evidence of substantial prejudice when a 
defendant’s sentence was near the maximum allowed by the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 258. The 10th and 11th Circuits had 
held that a “constitutional Booker error was harmless where the district 
court sentenced at the top of the range.” Id. at 259 n.3 (citing United 
States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 874-75 (10th Cir. 2005)). The 2nd 
Circuit reached a different conclusion, overturning a defendant’s 
sentencing under the Guidelines. In United States v. Lake the court 
determined that “the Government has not shown that the possibility is so 
remote as to render the sentencing error harmless.” Id. at 259 (quoting 
United States v. Lake, 419 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)). The 5th Circuit 
followed the holding in Lake, finding that “the government has failed to 
meet its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the district 
court would have imposed the same sentence under the post-Booker 
advisory sentencing regime.” Id. at 261-62. 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Clemency Proceedings – Federally Funded Counsel: Hain v. 
Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2006) 
 
The 10th Circuit “consider[ed] the reach of 21 U.S.C. § 
848(q)(4)(B), which provides federally-funded counsel for indigent state 
death row prisoners seeking federal habeas relief.” Id. at 1170. The court 
held “‘that counsel appointed under § 848(q)(4)(B) to represent state 
death row inmates in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings are authorized by the 
statute to represent these clients in state clemency proceedings and are 
entitled to compensation for clemency representation.’” Id. The 10th 
Circuit joined the 8th Circuit, noting that the “plain language of § 848(q) 
evidences a congressional intent to insure that indigent state petitioners 
receive reasonably necessary . . . clemency services from appointed 
counsel.” Id. at 1172 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th 
Cir. 1993)). By contrast, the 11th Circuit held that § 848(q)(B) applies 
only to federal proceedings. Id. 
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Money Laundering – Proof of Predicate Offense: United States 
v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2005) 
 
In this case, the 6th Circuit discussed a current circuit split over 
“whether funds must be traced to support a [money-laundering] 
conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 1957].” Id. at 404. The 6th Circuit 
explained that under the 1st Circuit view, “a § 1957 conviction ‘does not 
require proof that the defendant committed the specified predicate 
offense; it merely requires proof that the monetary transaction 
constituted the proceeds of a predicate offense.’” Id. On the other hand, 
the 6th Circuit noted that the 9th Circuit allows some tracing of funds in 
§ 1957 cases. Id. The 6th Circuit declined to take a position in this split 
because the Government did present sufficient evidence tying the money 
used in the transactions at issue to the defendant’s money laundering 
scheme. Id. at 404-05. 
 
Illegal Re-Entry of Alien – Collateral Estoppel: United States v. 
Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2005) 
 
In a case that reviewed illegal re-entry into the United States in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the 9th Circuit looked at the use of 
offensive collateral estoppel. The defendant alleged that the “district 
court improperly allowed the government to use collateral estoppel to 
prevent him from challenging two elements of the offense—namely, his 
status as an alien and his mens rea.” Id. at 919. The collateral estoppel 
doctrine “cautions litigants that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact has once 
been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be 
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’” Id. However, 
the court found that collateral estoppel needed to be applied rationally. 
Id. at 920. When the district court had ruled on the case at bar, prior 
circuit jurisprudence “had held that collateral estoppel could be used 
offensively against a criminal defendant in the context of illegal reentry 
prosecutions.” Id. Therefore, the district court “understandably ruled that 
Smith was collaterally estopped from contesting his status as an alien on 
the ground that he had admitted to that status in two of his prior guilty 
pleas.” Id. However, the 3rd, 10th, and 11th Circuits had all come to a 
different conclusion, determining that “collateral estoppel could not be 
used in a criminal case to prevent a defendant from contesting an element 
of the offense.” Id. However, the circuit split was resolved by a 
governmental “confession of error,” where “the government abandoned 
its defense of the use of offensive collateral estoppel against criminal 
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defendants, informing us that ‘in federal criminal trials, the United States 
may not use collateral estoppel to establish, as a matter of law, an 
element of an offense or to conclusively rebut an affirmative defense on 
which the Government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arnett, 353 F.3d 765, 766 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Armed Career Criminal Act – Definition of “Violent Felonies”: 
United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005) 
 
The 7th Circuit was presented with the question of whether the 
offense of drunk driving constitutes a “violent felony,” which is defined 
as “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” Id. at 708. The court noted that the 10th Circuit had answered 
this question in the affirmative, while the 8th Circuit had gone the other 
way. Id. at 709. Ultimately, the 7th Circuit followed its precedent, which 
held drunk driving to constitute a “violent felony.” Id. at 709. 
 
Drug Possession – Definition of “Cocaine Base”: United States v. 
Medina, 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2005) 
 
The defendant, Medina, argued that a jury instruction regarding 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) was “deficient because it permitted the jury to 
convict him under the statute, . . . without determining whether the 
substance he possessed was the particular form of cocaine base known as 
‘crack’ or was rather some other form of cocaine base.” Id. at 92. The 5th 
Circuit, citing the 7th Circuit decision in United States v. Edwards, 397 
F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005), acknowledged that the question of “whether the 
statute regulates only possession of crack or whether its rule 
encompasses other forms of cocaine base is the subject of some debate 
and conflict among the circuits.” Id. However, the 5th Circuit found that 
21 U.S.C. § 841 “regulates exactly what its terms suggest: the possession 
of any form of ‘cocaine base,’” and that defendant did not establish plain 
error in the jury instruction. Id. 
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AEDPA – Circuit Precedent in Habeas Petition: Musladin v. 
Lamargue, 427 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2005) 
 
This case arose from a panel rehearing of a 9th Circuit decision 
involving the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”). Id. at 647. The previous panel applied 9th Circuit precedent 
to overturn a murder conviction. Id. The dissenting judges noted that by 
this action the 9th Circuit had “sharpened a serious circuit split.” Id. The 
split arises from a statutory interpretation of the AEDPA which sets the 
standard for federal review of state court criminal convictions in habeas 
cases. Id. The statute states that “we may grant a habeas petition if and 
only if the last reasoned state court decision ‘was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Id. (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)). The 4th, 6th, 7th, and 10th Circuits have 
read the statute to expressly disallow federal courts from using circuit 
precedent when evaluating a habeas petition, only permitting the use of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. at 650. The 9th Circuit joins the 1st, 
3rd, and 8th circuits in holding that courts may rely on authority from the 
lower federal courts in considering a habeas petition. Id. at 651. 
Ultimately, the 9th Circuit found that the murder conviction should be 
overturned where, as here, the victim’s family wore buttons in the 
courtroom presenting a picture of the victim, despite no Supreme Court 
precedent stating that such display would offend defendant’s due process 
rights. Id. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
DNA Statutes – General Balancing Test: Nicholas v. Goord, 430 
F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 
In this case, the 2nd Circuit followed circuit precedent by 
employing the “special needs” test to determine whether a DNA-
indexing statute to assist in solving crimes served a special need. Id. at 
668. The court noted that the 7th and 10th Circuits have adopted the 
“special needs” test, while the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 11th Circuits have 
adopted the “general balancing test.” Id. at 659. The 2nd Circuit took 
issue with a 3rd Circuit opinion stating that the “special-needs inquiry is 
less rigorous than the general balancing test.” Id. at 664 n.22. The 2nd 
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Circuit noted that, “[t]he special needs exception requires the court to ask 
two questions. First, is the search justified by a special need beyond the 
ordinary need for normal law enforcement? Second, if the search does 
serve a special need, is the search reasonable when the government’s 
special need is weighed against the intrusion on the individual’s privacy 
interest?” Id. The 2nd Circuit reaffirmed its employment of the “special 
needs” test, noting that the general balancing test “only requires the court 
to balance the government’s interest in conducting the search against the 
individual’s privacy interests.” Id. 
 
Miranda Rights – Interrogation: Bridgers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 853 
(5th Cir. 2005) 
 
The 5th Circuit joined the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 8th Circuits in 
concluding that Miranda warnings “are adequate without explicitly 
stating that the right to have counsel includes having counsel present 
during the interrogation.” Id. at 859. In this case, the prisoner argued that 
Miranda “warnings given by Florida law enforcement officers prior to 
custodial interrogation were insufficient to protect his Fifth Amendment 
rights.” Id. at 857. The 5th Circuit noted that the Supreme Court 
instructed “reviewing courts to determine whether the warnings 
reasonably convey to the suspect his rights as required by Miranda.” Id. 
at 858 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)). On 
review, the 5th Circuit concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ 
conclusion that Miranda warnings given prior to custodial interrogation 
were sufficient was not unreasonable. Id. Taking the minority position, 
the 6th, 9th and 10th Circuits have concluded that Miranda requires a 
more explicit warning, including indications that a suspect has a right to 
counsel during interrogation. Id. at 859. 
 
